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Abstract 
In spite of the great U-turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, 
happiness inequality has fallen in countries that have experienced income growth (but not in those 
that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the “very unhappy” and the “perfectly 
happy”. Lower happiness inequality is found both between and within countries, and between and 
within individuals. Our cross-country regression results argue that the extension of various public 
goods helps to explain this greater happiness homogeneity. This new stylised fact arguably comes 
as a bonus to the Easterlin paradox, offering a somewhat brighter perspective for developing 
countries. 
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I. Introduction 
“Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all?” Richard Easterlin asked somewhat 
ironically in 1995 (Easterlin, 1995), having shown that average self-declared happiness generally 
does not increase over the long run, even during episodes of sustained economic growth (Easterlin, 
1974). This finding has helped inspire a vast empirical and theoretical literature on social 
comparisons and adaptation (as surveyed in Clark et al., 2008). Easterlin’s original finding has 
more recently been called into question, with it being suggested that in some countries there is a 
positive time-series correlation between per capita GDP and average levels of subjective well-being 
(a well-known contribution to this extent is Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008a). At the same time as 
this ongoing debate about the relationship between the average happiness level and GDP growth, a 
striking new stylised fact has recently emerged regarding the distribution of happiness or 
“happiness inequality”. As documented in Clark et al. (2014), there is strong evidence across a wide 
variety of datasets that GDP growth is associated with systematically lower levels of happiness 
inequality (where this latter is picked up by the coefficient of variation). This article contributes to 
this happiness-inequality literature.  
We provide evidence that economic growth is systematically correlated with a more even 
distribution of subjective well-being. This correlation for the most part holds despite the associated 
rise in income inequality, does not seem to be the result of any statistical artefact, is found in almost 
all domains of satisfaction, but is not found in placebo tests on other subjective variables. We 
suggest the extension of the provision of public goods as one likely candidate explanation for the 
lowering of happiness inequality. 
None of our analyses of countries over time reveal a significant relationship between GDP growth 
and average happiness. This classic finding has attracted great attention, as it suggests that 
economic growth may serve no (happiness) purpose. Outside of a utilitarian world, however, we 
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may be more Rawlsian and give a certain weight to the avoidance of misery: here higher GDP does 
seem to chalk up points. The value we attach to GDP growth will then depend on the particular 
social-welfare function that we have in mind. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 shows that higher income is 
associated with a tighter distribution of subjective well-being across countries, within countries, 
across individuals, and within individuals. Section 3 then presents a regression analysis 
emphasising the key roles of income inequality and public goods in determining happiness 
inequality. Section 4 considers a number of additional tests regarding the measurement of 
dispersion, the issue of time in panel (for our panel data results), and some placebo tests. Last, 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Income Growth and Happiness Inequality 
A great many pieces of work have used country-level data in order to show a relationship, or the 
lack of one, between GDP growth and average levels of satisfaction or happiness over time. 
However, until very recently, little attention was paid to inequality in subjective well-being as 
economies grew. Knowing that average happiness scores remained broadly unchanged does not tell 
us anything about the distribution of well-being: flat happiness time profiles can be associated with 
a stable distribution of happiness, rising inequality, or lower inequality. 
Two papers, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008b) and Dutta and Foster (2013), have explicitly addressed 
this issue. Both consider American General Social Survey (GSS) data from the early 1970s onwards 
(although their analytical approach differs); both underline a general fall in the inequality of 
happiness in the US up to around 2000, followed by an inversion of the trend (i.e. rising happiness 
inequality). Veenhoven (2005) found falling happiness inequality in EU countries (surveyed in the 
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Eurobarometer) over the years 1973-2001, in spite of rising income inequality. He also notes a 
tighter distribution of happiness in “modern nations” rather than more traditional countries.  
Clark et al. (2014) then looked at this issue systematically, using a wide variety of different datasets 
and a long time period (1970-2010). The crux of their argument is that countries with growing GDP 
per capita have also experienced falling happiness inequality. The data used there come from the 
World Values Survey (WVS), the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), the American GSS and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia survey (HILDA). Happiness inequality was picked up by the coefficient of variation (the 
standard deviation of happiness divided by the sample happiness mean).  
It is difficult to know what the correct measure of the distribution of subjective well-being is. One 
worry is that higher happiness levels will mechanically lead to lower dispersion as reflected in the 
coefficient of variation. If higher income produces greater happiness, on average, then the 
correlation between GDP per capita and the coefficient of variation of happiness will mechanically 
turn out to be negative. We here avoid the possibility of any artificial relationship by using the 
simple standard deviation of happiness as our measure of distribution. As we will show, this makes 
no difference to the main result that economic growth evens out the distribution of happiness (as we 
find no evidence in country panels that higher GDP per capita does actually raise average 
happiness). We will also test a number of other measures of the spread of happiness. 
Most countries with growing GDP per capita exhibit a tighter distribution of happiness, even though 
the US, with its U-shape of happiness inequality in GSS data, is an outlier in this respect. We 
provide a unified explanation of the experience of all countries, via a regression framework that 
encompasses the effect of GDP per capita, income inequality, and the role of public goods.  
The following sub-sections consider the relationship between income and happiness inequality, first 
in country cross-sections and panels, and then in individual cross-sections and panels. It finishes by 
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asking whether the correlation is a statistical artefact, and considering the relationship with domain 
satisfaction variables, rather than a single measure of overall well-being.  
2.1 WVS Country Cross‐Section 
Our first piece of evidence follows on from Clark et al. (2014) by looking at country cross-sections 
from the last available wave of the WVS (in the 2000s). Figure 1 shows the results. The left-hand 
panel reveals that the standard deviation of happiness is lower in richer countries. This relationship 
is significant at the one per cent level, as shown by the regression equation at the foot of the figure. 
The right-hand side panel (taken from Clark et al., 2014) shows the equivalent relationship using 
the coefficient of variation. The slope may look flatter, but of course the dependent variable is not 
on the same scale. In both cases, richer countries have tighter happiness distributions. 
[Place Figure 1 here] 
2.2 WVS Country Panel 
The next piece of evidence comes from changes over time within countries. We first consider WVS 
countries. These are a priori interviewed five years apart, although the gap may be somewhat 
shorter or somewhat longer. In Figure 2A we include WVS countries that are observed at least 
twice, with the gap between observations being at least five years. We also only include countries 
that recorded positive real GDP per capita growth (where these figures come from the Penn World 
Tables) in all of the intervening years between the two consecutive WVS observations.1 What 
happened to happiness inequality in these growth periods? 
[Place Figure 2A here] 
                                                 
1 This Figure differs from that in Clark et al. (2014), which only considered the coefficient of variation and which 
included countries with both positive growth in all years and positive growth in some years. 
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Figure 2A answers this question using data from a selection of Western countries. Although there is 
some sample variability here, happiness inequality falls over time as countries grow richer. The 
average relationship over time in these countries is given by the grey line in the Figure. Again, it 
makes little difference whether we consider the standard deviation or the coefficient of variation. 
The trend line slopes downwards in both panels of Figure 2A: as countries become richer, their 
inequality in happiness falls. This is formalised in the regression equation at the foot of the figure, 
where “year” attracts a negative and significant coefficient.2 
While suggestive, neither Figure 1 nor Figure 2A arguably provides evidence of a clean causal 
relationship. In the cross-section analysis, there could be some innate country characteristic that 
both makes a country rich and reduces the spread of its happiness distribution; in Figure 2A there 
has perhaps been a generic move towards reduced happiness inequality across all countries, which 
has nothing to do with GDP growth per se. 
One obvious rejoinder to the latter is to consider countries that did not experience such periods of 
continuous GDP growth, and show that the relationship is different for them. This is what we do in 
Figure 2B, where we select countries that experienced some years with falling real GDP per capita 
between the two WVS observations (although there are fewer of these). Figure 2B reveals a 
substantial rise in happiness inequality in these countries. Hence, there is no evidence of a general 
trend towards a tighter distribution of subjective well-being over time in the WVS: this tightening is 
only found for countries which have systematically become richer. It is worth noting that this 
finding is not particular to the WVS. We can reproduce Figure 2A using 40 years of annual data 
from the Eurobarometer: these results are depicted in Appendix A Figure 1. 
[Place Figure 2B here] 
                                                 
2 We restrict the sample to Western countries here only to avoid cluttering the figure excessively. The same shape 
appears if we include all WVS countries: the regression for the left-hand panel of Figure 2A then becomes 
SD(Satisfaction)=0.008***year+19.33. 
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2.3 BHPS, SOEP, HILDA and GSS: Country Panels 
One drawback of the WVS is its small time-series dimension.3 We therefore now turn to single-
country datasets, which contain many more waves of data. We use four popular long-running 
single-country datasets, covering the United Kingdom (BHPS), Germany (SOEP), Australia 
(HILDA), and the United States (GSS). We summarise the way in which happiness and GDP co-
move over time in the regressions in Table 1. The first three columns refer to regressions for our 
three dependent variables: the log of real GDP per capita, average life satisfaction, and the standard 
deviation of life satisfaction. We carry out separate regressions for each of the four countries. The 
control variables in each regression include standard demographics (as listed in the note at the foot 
of the table), the year (divided by 10) and (if significant) year-squared divided by 100. We include 
the latter to detect non-linear movements over time. We might in particular suspect that inequality 
in life satisfaction in the US is U-shaped over time, following the findings of Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2008b) and Dutta and Foster (2013). 
[Place Table 1 here] 
The results in column 1 show that real GDP per capita has trended upwards in all four countries, 
with no evidence of any non-linearities. Column 2 suggests that average happiness is flat in all four 
countries. 
We are most interested in the results in column 3, which show the trend in happiness inequality. In 
the UK and Australia, this trend is negative and linear. However, in both the US (as previously 
found) and Germany there is evidence of a U-shaped relationship. Column 4 calculates the turning 
point in happiness inequality in these two countries. These turn out to be 1993 for the US,4 and 
                                                 
3 The WVS started in 1981 and has been repeated every five years since 1990-1991. The sixth wave is currently in the 
field. 
4This turning point is somewhat earlier than that in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008b) and Dutta and Foster (2013), which 
undoubtedly comes from our use of control variables in Table 1. 
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rather later in 2007 for Germany. We will below suggest that the U-shapes in these two countries 
are at least partly driven by developments in income inequality.5 
2.4 BHPS, SOEP, HILDA and GSS: Individual Cross‐Sections 
At the individual level, within each country, happiness dispersion is also smaller amongst the rich 
than amongst the less well-off (Figure 3): the richer seem to be more insulated against various kinds 
of shocks. In particular, higher income allows consumption to be protected from movements in 
income.6 And it is in general likely that higher income allows the hedonic impact of various life 
shocks (job loss, divorce, etc.) to be smoothed.  
[Place Figure 3 here] 
2.5 BHPS, SOEP and HILDA: Individual Panels 
Figure 3 referred to pooled data. We can also use our three panel datasets (we thus drop the GSS 
here) to look at the same correlation within-individual. The within-individual volatility of life 
satisfaction over time is lower for those in higher income deciles, as illustrated in Figure 4 (where 
the income decile we assign to the individual in the panel data is defined as the average rounded 
income decile over the period during which the individual is observed in the panel). 
[Place Figure 4 here] 
                                                 
5 Analogous relations between GDP and happiness inequality are found in Eurobarometer data. We show a number of 
the relevant single-country graphs in Appendix A Figure 2. Happiness inequality trends downwards in all eight of the 
countries shown there. 
6 Which is why consumption varies less over time than does income: see Krueger and Perri (2006). 
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2.6 A Statistical Artefact? 
All of our results so far suggest that higher income goes hand in hand with less happiness 
inequality. However, we may worry that this is a statistical artefact. In particular, if higher incomes 
make people happier, and happiness is measured using a bounded scale, then inequality will fall as 
more people become right-censored on the top rung of the happiness ladder. At the extreme, as 
everyone reports the top subjective well-being score, inequality will be zero.  
A first response to this worry is that there is actually no evidence in Table 1 that higher income over 
time does go hand-in-hand with higher happiness. We can nonetheless directly address the changing 
distribution of subjective well-being via histograms of happiness at the beginning and end of the 
periods under consideration. This is what Clark et al. (2014) do. Their striking finding is that, as 
GDP grows, fewer people report the lowest happiness scores. But far from becoming more heavily 
populated, the top category is becoming increasingly deserted in all of the BHPS, GSS, HILDA and 
SOEP. As a consequence, the middle happiness categories are increasingly popular. The fall in 
happiness inequality then actually seems to have come from a mean-preserving contraction, as the 
percentage reporting the lowest happiness levels is also falling.7 
A further formal test, if required, of the role of censoring comes from dropping the top and bottom 
scores in the panel datasets.8 The test here is to look at happiness answers in year t+1 of those who 
reported happiness scores of between 2 and 6 (on a 1 to 7 scale) in the BHPS data (say) at year t. 
All of these individuals can report either higher or lower happiness when re-interviewed in year 
                                                 
7In general, objective happiness is converted into reported happiness via a “reporting function”. It is possible that 
reporting functions change as income grows. For this to explain our results, such reporting functions would have to 
operate both in the cross-section and in time series, and operate in something of the same way across countries. Equally, 
the fact that the richer seem more insulated against various kinds of shocks can be explained by a concave reporting 
function. We arguably know only little about reporting functions, and how they may change over time, and differ 
between individuals. 
8 We cannot do this in the GSS, of course, as it is not panel. 
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t+1. As in Table 1, the results in Figure 3 in Appendix A show that there continues to be a trend to 
lower happiness inequality as GDP grows in the three panels.  
2.7 Well‐being Domains 
Is there something strange about the specific distribution of overall satisfaction scores? Figure 5 
suggests mostly not. We here look at the trends in inequality in various domain satisfactions. 
Satisfaction with health, income and job all exhibit falling inequality in the UK, Germany and 
Australia. As was the case for life satisfaction, the US is an outlier. Job satisfaction inequality is 
(slightly) falling, but not that for health and income. We suspect that income inequality may play a 
crucial role here: this is the topic of the next section.  
[Place Figure 5 here] 
3. Regression Analysis: Income Inequality and Public Goods 
The results above come from analyses without any controls other than basic demographics. Can we 
now identify variables that help to explain the fall in happiness inequality over time? We here 
consider the role of income inequality and public goods. Recent years have seen rising incomes 
accompanied by rising income inequality9 in many countries (which we would suppose to increase 
happiness inequality).10 We do indeed find rising income inequality over time in the BHPS, GSS, 
HILDA and SOEP datasets. 
At the same time, we may also reasonably expect income growth in general to produce public goods 
(like education, health, public infrastructure and social protection). Modern growth, in addition, 
                                                 
9 See Atkinson et al. (2011). 
10 Becchetti et al. (2014) find that education reduces and unemployment increases happiness inequality. They however 
do not find any role for income inequality. Their measure of the latter is the share of the poor, which is different from 
ours. 
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comes with non-material public goods, such as lower violence and crime, greater freedom of choice 
in private life, political freedom, transparency and pluralism, better governance, and so on 
(Inglehart, 1997, and Inglehart et al., 2008). These public goods are, by definition, available to 
everyone (although, of course, their marginal benefit may differ across individuals). We then 
suspect that their provision will reduce happiness inequality.  
The role of income inequality and public goods in determining the standard deviation of life 
satisfaction is explored in Table 2. The data here is the WVS and these are OLS regressions.11The 
“public-good”-type variables we consider are Government expenditure, Life expectancy, the under-
five Mortality rate, the Control of Corruption, Civil Liberties, Trust and Religious Fractionalisation. 
While we group these together under the heading “Public Goods”, they are not all 100% publicly-
provided. Amongst the variables in Table 2, health is probably a publicly-provided public good, 
whereas something like trust is at least partly privately-produced.  
[Place Table 2 here] 
We also control separately for the level of GDP per capita and income inequality by country-year. 
All of the explanatory variables are described in Appendix B. The four separate regressions in 
Table 2 are balanced, in that they are estimated only on the sample of observations with no missing 
values for the most complete specification (that in column 4).  
The changes over time in our seven public-goods variables over our broad analysis period appear in 
the Electronic Appendix. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP has been on an upward 
trend over the past 20 years, and Life expectancy has risen sharply since the early 1980s, at the 
same time as the under-five Mortality rate has been falling. On the contrary the upward trend in 
Trust (from the WVS) is only weak, and there is no discernible trend in the Control of Corruption 
                                                 
11 We find the same results in ordered probit analysis. 
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and Civil Liberties. The last figure here shows the rise in income inequality since 1970, using data 
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). 
The first column of Table 2 confirms, as expected from Figure 1, that happiness inequality does 
indeed fall with the log of GDP per capita.12 Column 2 then adds income inequality, as measured by 
the Mean Log Deviation in Income, and our measure of Government expenditure. These attract 
insignificant coefficients, and their addition only mildly affects the estimated coefficient on log 
GDP per capita.13 Column 3 adds the Life expectancy, under-five Mortality, Control of Corruption 
and Civil Liberties. Their inclusion turns the coefficient on GDP per capita insignificant, while the 
estimated coefficients on these “public-good” variables are of the expected sign (better outcomes 
reduce happiness inequality). Economic growth thus seems to reduce happiness inequality because 
it provides public goods that tighten the distribution of subjective well-being: the correlation 
between GDP per capita and Life expectancy, Mortality and the Control of Corruption are all 
around 0.8 in absolute value, while that with Civil Liberties is 0.67. Last, column 4 adds measures 
of Trust and Religious fractionalisation to the regression. Neither of these is significant14 (although 
religious fractionalisation varies only little within countries over time, and we here include country 
fixed effects). Income inequality is positively correlated with happiness inequality in column (4). 
Income growth would therefore seem to reduce happiness inequality because it allows for the 
greater provision of public goods. However, if this growth is accompanied by too large a rise in 
income inequality, then it is entirely possible that happiness inequality will actually rise as a result: 
                                                 
12 The errors are clustered at the country-year level here (which is the aggregation level of GDP per capita), to avoid 
under-estimating the standard errors: see Moulton (1990). 
13 We might worry about reverse causality, with subjective well-being affecting productivity at work, and thus income 
(see Ostroff, 1992, for survey analysis and Oswald et al., 2015, for an experimental approach). Our argument 
throughout this paper is a second-moment one, relating the level of income to the spread of the subjective well-being 
distribution. We actually find no relationship between average income and average well-being in our individual-country 
panels (see column 2 of Table 1). The only way in which movements in life satisfaction could then drive the level of 
income would be if the rising life satisfaction of the previously dissatisfied increases productivity more than the falling 
life satisfaction of the previously satisfied reduces productivity. We know of no evidence for such non-linear effects. 
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this is arguably what we have observed in the US data above, and perhaps to a lesser extent in 
Germany. 
4. Additional Tests 
All of our analysis above uses the standard deviation in respondents’ self-declared satisfaction as 
our key dispersion measure. Such a measure assumes that happiness is continuous and cardinal, 
with equal distances between the steps. Although such an assumption is common in the field, we 
have no way of knowing whether it is actually true. To be on the safe side, we have reproduced our 
results using the Index of Ordinal Variation (Berry and Mielke, 1992), a measure of variation 
specifically designed for ordinal measures.15As shown in Clark et al. (2014), the movement over 
time in the IOV is practically identical to that in the standard deviation of happiness, so it is perhaps 
unsurprising that they produce such similar results. 
One common cardinal measure of dispersion is the Gini coefficient. The movements over time in 
the Gini coefficient of subjective well-being are depicted in Appendix Figure 4. As was the case for 
the standard deviation, this falls over time, with a sharp upturn towards the end of the period in the 
US, and a smaller upturn for West Germany. A regression such as that in column 1 of Table 2 with 
the Gini of well-being as the dependent variable produces a negative significant coefficient; adding 
the controls in column 4 renders this coefficient insignificant. 
Our empirical results in Section 3 come from both repeated cross-section and panel data. One 
potential problem in panel data is that of “panel conditioning”. Landua (1992) underlined that 
individuals seem to become used to satisfaction scales after a while in SOEP data. He, in particular, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
14 It is not always easy to have good measures of social capital at the cross-country level. Although trust is insignificant 
in this regression, some other measure of social capital may do better. The difficulty is in finding consistent measures 
across countries and over time. 
15Dutta and Foster (2013) also propose an ordinal measure of happiness inequality.  
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noted a tendency away from the end values. This finding was reproduced on more recent SOEP data 
by Frick et al. (2006). Wooden and Li (2014) analyse HILDA data and find a clear narrowing in the 
dispersion of satisfaction scores over the first few waves in which the individual responds. We have 
checked what happens to the trend in life satisfaction when we drop the first two participation 
waves per individual. The results appear in Appendix Figure 5 for our three panel data sets, and 
continue to show a downward trend in dispersion, with again the exception of the final few years in 
West Germany.16 
Last, it might be suspected that there is something inherent about self-reported variables, 
particularly in a panel-data context, which produces more homogenous responses over time. We 
here run a placebo test by looking at the changing standard deviation over time in other variables 
available in our four single-country datasets. For the BHPS, SOEP and GSS, we use self-reported 
interest in politics, which is measured on a one-to-four ordinal scale; in HILDA we consider the 
self-reported number of hours per week spent volunteering.  
The results appear in Appendix A Figure 6. There is little evidence of any particular trend in the 
dispersion of these measures over time, and certainly no evidence of a downward trend. The 
shrinking dispersion of subjective well-being over time in our datasets appears to be specific to this 
question, rather than a general feature of self-reports. 
5. Conclusions 
In spite of the great U-turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, 
happiness inequality has notably fallen in countries that have experienced consistent income growth 
(but not in those that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the “very unhappy” and 
                                                 
16We have also taken the opposite tack, and kept only the first five responses in the panel. The same result pertains. 
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the “perfectly happy”. The extension of public amenities may have contributed to this greater 
happiness homogeneity by reducing the insecurity faced by the worst-off groups in the population.  
We believe that higher national income goes hand-in-hand with a reduced spread in happiness. It 
can always be countered that there are potential common factors that drive both income/GDP and 
the inequality of happiness. One example, at the country level, might be the quality of institutions. 
Higher quality institutions (including educational institutions) might lead to both higher GDP and a 
smaller spread in happiness. Any omitted variable which explains all of our empirical findings 
would however have to vary across countries and within countries over time, and across individuals 
and within individuals over time, in the same way that income does: no obvious candidates come to 
mind. 
The question of why the top of the happiness scale is increasingly deserted is perhaps a more 
difficult one to answer. One salient point is that the extension of public goods and government 
expenditure is costly, and the happier may have borne the brunt of the necessary taxation. A second 
explanation, which is far more difficult to test, is that growth has enlarged the world of possibilities 
of those previously at the top of the well-being distribution, raising their aspirations and reducing 
their satisfaction. Comparisons may be made not only within country, but also across countries (as 
suggested by Becchetti et al., 2013), and the worldwide integration of the elite is likely an integral 
part of globalization (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004). It is also possible that some of the by-
products of economic growth have rendered comparisons to others easier to make and more salient. 
This is very likely the case with the internet. Clark and Senik (2010) show that those who have 
internet access at home are also more likely to report that they compare their income to others 
(although they do not have data on exogenous changes in internet access, for which see Lohmann, 
2014). Over the course of economic growth, this dampening effect will be concentrated amongst the 
richer, and perhaps also amongst those who were previously among the happiest. 
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As in much of this literature, we find no evidence that economic growth has been accompanied by 
higher mean levels of subjective well-being. But we show that it has come along with reduced 
happiness inequality. This new “augmented” Easterlin paradox therefore offers a somewhat brighter 
perspective: economic growth is a useful tool for policy-makers who care not only about average 
subjective well-being, but also its distribution. 
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Figures		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	1.	Happiness	Inequality	and	GDP	per	capita.	WVS	Cross‐Section,	Last	
available	year	(2000s)	
	
S.D. 	of	Life	Satisfaction	 	 	 S.D. 	of	Life	Satisfaction	/	Mean	
	 	
Notes: These figures are based on the most recent available year for each country in the World Values Survey. 
Happiness inequality is measured as the standard deviation or coefficient of variation of life satisfaction per 
country per year. The right-hand figure above is taken from Clark et al. (2014). 
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Figure	2A.	Happiness	Inequality	within	Countries	with	Uninterrupted	GDP	
Growth.	WVS	Panel.	Selected	Western	countries	
 
S.D. 	of	Life	Satisfaction	 	 	 	S.D.	of	Life	Satisfaction	/	Mean	
           
Note: The points show the levels of life-satisfaction inequality for countries with uninterrupted real GDP 
growth, over periods of at least 5 years. 
Figure	2B.		Happiness	Inequality	within	Country	in	Countries	with	Falling	
GDP.	WVS	Panel.		
 
S.D. 	of	Life	Satisfaction	 	 	 	S.D.	of	Life	Satisfaction	/	Mean	
         
 
Note: The lines show the levels of life-satisfaction inequality for countries with some periods of negative 
growth, over periods of at least 5 years. 
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Figure	3.	Income	as	a	Buffer	Stock:	The	Standard	Deviation	of	Happiness	is	
Lower	in	Higher	Income	Deciles		
United	Kingdom 	(BHPS)	 	 	 	 	 								West	Germany	(SOEP)	
           
Australia	(HILDA)											 	 	 	 	 	 United	States(GSS)	
	 	
Notes: Standard deviations of life satisfaction are calculated by income decile. We select people aged between 
18 and 65 years old; we also drop observations corresponding to a declared income of below 500$ per year.  
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Figure	4.	Income	as	a	Buffer	Stock:	The	Standard	Deviation	of	Happiness	
within	Individual	over	Time	is	Lower	for	Individuals	in	Higher	Income	
Deciles		
	
United	Kingdom 	(BHPS)	 	 	 	 	 								West	Germany	(SOEP)	
 
 
Australia	(HILDA)	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Notes: Standard deviations of life satisfaction are calculated by individual, over time and then averaged by 
income decile. We select people aged between 18 and 65 years old; we also drop observations corresponding to 
a declared income of below 500$ per year. “Income decile” is defined as the rounded average income decile per 
individual over their period in the panel. 
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Figure	5.	Trends	in	Satisfaction	Inequality	by	Domain	
United	Kingdom	(BHPS)	
Health	(1‐7)		 	 	 Income	(1‐7)	 	 Job	(1‐7)	
         
West	Germany	(SOEP) 
Health	(0‐10)	 	 	 Income	(0‐10)	 	 Job	(0‐10)	
	
Australia	(HILDA)	
Health	(0‐10)		 	 	 Income	(0‐10)	 	 Job	(0‐10)	
	
United	States	(GSS)	
Health	(1‐7)		 	 	 Income	(1‐3)	 	 Job(1‐4)	
	
Notes: We select people aged between 18 and 65 years old; we also drop observations corresponding to a 
declared income of below 500$ per year. GDP per capita figures are taken from Heston, Summers and Aten - 
the Penn World Tables. 	
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Tables	
	
Table	1.	Time	Trends	in	GDP	per	capita,	Happiness	and	Happiness	
Inequality.	Single‐country	Panels.	
 
 Ln Real GDP per Capita 
Life  
Satisfaction 
S.D. of Life 
Satisfaction 
Estimated 
Minimum Year 
United Kingdom (BHPS)     
Year/10 0.226*** (0.0140) 
0.0005 
(0.0165) 
-0.0493*** 
(0.0107) -- 
Year2/ 100 -- -- --  
West Germany (SOEP)     
Year/10 0.402*** (0.0113) 
0.0007 
(0.0220) 
-28.90*** 
(4.650) 2007 
Year2/ 100 -- -- 0.0720*** (0.0116)  
Australia (HILDA)     
Year/10 0.153*** (0.0188) 
-0.00135 
(0.0214) 
-0.181*** 
(0.0372) -- 
Year2/ 100 -- -- --  
United States (GSS)     
Year/10 0.195*** (0.00617) 
0.00389 
(0.00586) 
-3.779*** 
(0.499) 1993 
Year2/ 100 -- -- 0.00948*** (0.00125)  
 
Note: Happiness and life satisfaction questions are administered consistently over time within countries for all 
of these surveys, although the surveys use different scales: 1-3 in the GSS, 0-10 in the SOEP and HILDA, and 
1-7 in the BHPS. We select people aged between 18 and 65 years old; we also drop observations corresponding 
to a declared income of below 500$ per year. GDP per capita figures are taken from Heston, Summers and Aten 
– the Penn World Tables. The other controls include gender, age, age-squared, marital status, labour-force status 
and education. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table	2.	OLS	Estimates	of	the	Determinants	of	SD	Life	Satisfaction:	WVS‐EVS	
(1981	‐2008)	
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln GDP Per capita -0.298** (0.128) 
-0.240* 
(0.137) 
-0.129 
(0.117) 
-0.127 
(0.116) 
Mean Log Deviation in 
Income  
0.543* 
(0.329) 
0.771** 
(0.328) 
0.776** 
(0.354) 
Government Expenditure (% 
of GDP)  
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
Life expectancy at birth   -0.022* (0.012) 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 
1000 live births)   
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Control of Corruption   0.001 (0.025) 
0.001 
(0.025) 
Limits on Civil Liberties   0.083*** (0.030) 
0.083*** 
(0.030) 
Trust    0.011 (0.128) 
Religious Fractionalisation    -0.572 (1.130) 
     
Observations 198,585 198,585 198,585 198,585
No. Countries 70 70 70 70
No. Country-year 161 161 161 161
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.899 0.910 0.910
Notes: The other controls include country fixed effects, time trends, age-category dummies, sex, labour-force 
status, and marital status. The errors are clustered at the country-year level. See Appendix B for the detailed 
variable descriptions. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level and *** significant at the 1% 
level. Weighted estimates. 
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Appendix	A.	
 
Appendix	 Figure	 1.	 Happiness	 Inequality	 within	 Country	 in	 Growing	
Countries.	Eurobarometer.	Selected	Western	countries	
 
S.D	of	life	satisfaction 	
 
	
Appendix	Figure	2.	Single‐country	Trends	in	Income	Growth	and	Happiness	
Inequality,	Eurobarometer.		
	
United Kingdom      Luxembourg     
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France          Denmark 
 
Netherlands             Italy 
  
Belgium               Ireland 
 
Notes: Life satisfaction is administered on a 4-point scale. We select people aged between 18 and 65. GDP per 
capita figures are taken from Heston, Summers and Aten – the Penn World Tables. The values plotted are SD 
residuals by year from a regression of life satisfaction on gender, age, age-squared, marital status, employment 
status and education. 
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Appendix.	Figure	3.	The	Trend	in	the	Standard	Deviation	of	Happiness	
Excluding	People	Who	Report	the	Highest	or	Lowest	Levels	of	Happiness	
 
United	Kingdom 	(BHPS)					 	 	 																	West	Germany	(SOEP)	
 
Australia	(HILDA)																																														
          
Note: We drop observations corresponding to people who reported being in the top or bottom life satisfaction 
categories one year previously.  
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Appendix.	Figure	4.	The	Trend	in	the	Gini	Coefficient	of	Subjective	Well‐
Being	
 
United Kingdom (BHPS)                           West Germany (SOEP) 
 
 
Australia (HILDA)                               United States (GSS) 
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Appendix.	Figure	5.	The	Trend	in	the	Standard	Deviation	of	Happiness	
Excluding	the	First	Two	Years	People	Report	Life	Satisfaction	
 
United	Kingdom 	(BHPS)					 	 	 																	West	Germany	(SOEP)	
 
Australia	(HILDA)																																														
          
Note: We drop observations corresponding to the first two years in which individuals appear in the panels in 
question.  
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Appendix	Figure	6.	Placebo	Variables	
 
Interest in politics     Interest in politics 
 
United Kingdom (BHPS)                         West Germany (SOEP) 
 
 
Volunteering      Interest in politics 
 
Australia (HILDA)                               United States (GSS) 
 
 
Notes: Interest in politics ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 means “very interested” and 4 “not at all interested”. 
Participation in volunteer work is defined as the number of hours per week. 
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Appendix	B.	
This paper uses the five currently available waves of the World Values Survey (WVS, 1981-2008), 
covering 105 countries. These include high-income, low-income and transition countries, as well as 
data from the ISSP and the 2002 Latinobarómetro. We also analyze individual-country surveys, such 
as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, 1996-2008), the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP,1 1984-2009), the American General Social Survey (GSS, 1972-2010) and the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey (HILDA, 2001-2009).  
The Happiness and Life Satisfaction questions were administered in the same format across all these 
surveys, but with different response scales: 1-3 in the GSS, 1-10 in the WVS, 0-10 in the SOEP and 
the Australian HILDA, 1-7 in the BHPS. The wording of the life satisfaction question in the WVS 
was “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?: 1 
(dissatisfied)….10(very satisfied)”. In the SOEP, it was “How satisfied are you with your life, all 
things considered?”: 0 (totally unsatisfied) … 10 (totally satisfied). The BHPS survey asked “How 
dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?”: 1 (not satisfied at all) … 7 (completely 
satisfied)”. The wording of the happiness question in the GSS was “Taken all together, how would 
you say things are these days - would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too 
happy?”. We do not need to harmonize these scales, as we consider the evolution of the variance of 
happiness over time within countries. The surveys cover representative samples of the population in 
participating countries, with an average sample size of ten to fifteen thousand respondents in each 
wave. We select people aged between 18 and 65 years old; we also drop observations corresponding 
to a declared income of below 500$ per year.  
We use the American General Social Survey because it is the only long-run survey containing a 
happiness or life satisfaction question in the United States. However, this data is not really suited to 
our purpose, as only three responses are possible (very happy, pretty happy, and not too happy), 
making the calculation of the variance problematic. However, as the evidence initially used to suggest 
the Easterlin paradox partly relied on American data, and because we would like to include data from 
the United States, we do report the results based on this data, although they may need to be considered 
with some caution.  
	
Description	of	the	Country‐level	Control	Variables	used	in	Table	2	
 
GDP per capita. GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars (Penn World Tables) 
Mean Log Deviation in Income is a measure of income inequality derived from WVS.  
World Bank Database (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx) 
Expenditure (% of GDP). This is cash payments for operating activities of the government in 
providing goods and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), 
                                                            
1See Wagner et al. (2007). 
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interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends. When 
there is no information for some years, the first year available is used as a replacement. 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years). This is given by the number of years a newborn infant would 
live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births). This is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn 
baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates.  
Governance Indicators  
Control of corruption (Transparency International). This index measures the perceived levels of 
public sector corruption on a scale of 0-10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly 
corrupt and a 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean. When there is no information for 
some years, the first year available is used as a replacement. 
Limits on Civil liberties (Freedom House). Civil Liberties contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 
for each country or territory, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. Civil liberties 
contains information on freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule 
of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. 
World Values Survey  
Trust is the percentage of individuals who answer “most people can be trusted” to the question 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?”.  
Fractionalisation Data  
Religious Fractionalisation comes from the fractionalisation dataset compiled by Alberto Alesina 
and associates and measures the degree of religious heterogeneity in various countries. When there is 
no information for some years, the last year available is used as a replacement. 
